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CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery

Sources read 2026-10-29. MITRE's own page · All weakness notes · Added to CISA's list in the last seven days

What it is

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

MITRE classes it as a base-level weakness.

What it lets an attacker do

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

  • Read Application Data (affects: confidentiality)
  • Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands (affects: integrity)
  • Bypass Protection Mechanism (affects: access control)

On CISA's exploited list

From CISA's exploited list

5 of the 108 entries CISA added from 2026-08-02 to 2026-10-30 name CWE-918, against 2 of 69 in the 90 days before. Over the whole catalogue 24 entries name it. The counts are small, so read them as a rough order, not a rate.

CISA's list is not every flaw that is exploited: it holds the ones CISA has evidence of, listed on the day it added them.

  • CVE-2026-96655, Plex Media Server, added 2026-10-20
  • CVE-2026-96652, Plex Media Server, added 2026-10-20
  • CVE-2026-49869, Kestra Kestra OSS, added 2026-09-02
  • CVE-2026-83548, SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances, added 2026-09-02
  • CVE-2026-64849, MLflow MLflow, added 2026-08-19

How MITRE says to find it

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

  • Automated Static Analysis

What MITRE suggests

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

These are MITRE's suggestions, quoted as it gives them. They are not a complete fix and not a substitute for reading the vendor's advisory for the product you run.

  • Implementation: If there is a known list of applications, IP, hostname, and/or domains to which the product is allowed to communicate, then use allowlists to ensure that outgoing requests are restricted to these known entities.
  • Implementation: If the product is expected to be able to connect to arbitrary IP addresses or domains, consider using a denylist that includes private network addresses, internal domain names, etc. The denylist could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.

Attack patterns MITRE links to it

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

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