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Malware served through Optimizely to 178 organisations' websites: what to check if you visited one on 16 November

·9 min read

On 16 November 2026, for roughly 17 hours, malicious JavaScript ran on the websites of some of the world's largest brands. It did not get there by breaking into those companies. It came through Optimizely Web, an A/B-testing service whose script those sites load on every page. Report URI, which found and documented it, counted 188 infected Optimizely scripts belonging to 178 organisations, found mostly through its own crawl, and says the real number is likely higher. In one sweep between 19:24 and 19:59 UTC on 16 November, 186 of the 1,611 scripts it checked were infected.

Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page at 01:02 UTC on 17 November: "an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects." It says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected user accounts and "put additional protections in place".

If you browsed the web on 16 November you may have visited one of these sites without knowing. The code was invisible unless it acted. This note is for you first: what it did, how to tell whether it touched you, and what to do, in order. The second half is for anyone who runs a website with third-party scripts on it. Every fact is as of 17 November 2026 and links to its source at the end.

The short version

  • When: from about 04:21 UTC on 16 November (first infected copy seen, on the BBC's script) to a mass clean-up between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC. At 21:52 UTC one infected script remained, per Report URI.
  • Where: sites using Optimizely Web. Report URI names Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock among them, across banking, retail, airlines, telecoms, streaming, healthcare, charities and gambling.
  • What the code could do in any visitor's browser: swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses (on the page and in your clipboard), skim card details typed into a site's own form fields, and, when it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, send your readable cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker.
  • What it did on iPhones and iPads: loaded exploit kits aimed at iOS, in a hidden frame. On iOS 18.6 or earlier the page reloaded every 60 seconds to retry, a visible symptom Report URI describes.
  • Money: about $7,040 had reached the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC, per Report URI. That counts receipts seen on the blockchain, not the full loss, and says nothing about cards.
  • Who did it: unattributed. Optimizely says the way in was a vulnerability in its own service; it has not published the detail.

Am I affected?

You may be affected if all three are true: you visited a site that uses Optimizely Web, you did it on 16 November between about 04:00 and 22:00 UTC, and you did one of the things the code waited for. Visiting alone exposed your browser to the script, but most of the harm needed an action from you, or an iPhone that was not up to date.

What the code did, by what you did on the page. From Report URI's analysis of the script (16 November 2026).
If you…What the code could doRisk to you
Copied or pasted a crypto wallet address, on the affected site or anywhere else while its tab was openReplace the address with the attacker's, in the clipboard, the page, links, forms and outgoing requestsMoney sent to the attacker. Blockchain transfers cannot be reversed.
Typed a card number, expiry and CVV into the site's own formRead all three and send them to the attackerCard fraud. Cards typed into a payment provider's embedded frame (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of its reach.
Were on a page where it swapped a wallet address near wallet or payment wordingSend the page address, your cookies that scripts can read, the original addresses and a screenshot of the pageOur assessment: if that site keeps your session in such a cookie, someone could use it to act as you there; and whatever the screenshot showed is exposed.
Used an iPhone or iPadCheck your iOS version and load an exploit chain matched to itDevice compromise on older iOS. Report URI says the kit's own comments treat iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched.
Only read the page on a computer and copied nothingRun the script, which watched for addresses and card detailsOur assessment: low, if you copied no address and typed no card.

The list of 178 is a floor, not the whole picture. Report URI and Hudson Rock both traced the same malicious code being served through other third-party scripts from 13 November (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly, on sites such as faz.net and foxsports.com). Hudson Rock says its trace does not establish that those suppliers were themselves breached. Either way, a site that does not use Optimizely is not automatically clear for 13 to 16 November. Salesforce told BleepingComputer it has disabled Optimizely scripts across its instances as a precaution.

What to do first, in this order

1. iPhone or iPad: update now. Go to Settings, General, Software Update, and install the newest version your device accepts, then restart it. This is the one step that matters even if you did nothing on any site. If your device cannot install iOS 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later, treat it as still exposed. Our advice: stop using it for banking, crypto and unfamiliar sites, and turn on Lockdown Mode if your version offers it (Apple's page is linked at the end).

2. Crypto: check every transfer you made on 16 November. Open your wallet or exchange history and compare each destination address, in full, with the address you meant to pay. Check it on the wallet's own screen or the hardware wallet's display, not against something you pasted. The swap replaced a valid address with another valid one of the same type, so the transfer will not have failed. If you find a swapped address, report it at once to the exchange you sent from and to the police or your national fraud-reporting service (in the US, ic3.gov). Report URI says the stolen funds were moved to an exchange deposit address the same afternoon; our assessment is that a fast report to that exchange is the best chance of anything being frozen. Also, if you copied a wallet address while an affected tab was open, your clipboard may still hold the attacker's address: copy it again from the original source before you use it.

3. Cards: if you typed a card into an affected site's own checkout form on 16 November, Report URI and BleepingComputer say watch your statements and contact your card issuer. Our advice goes further: tell the issuer the card may have been skimmed on that date and ask for a new card number. You usually cannot tell whether a form was the site's own or a payment provider's frame, so if in doubt, treat it as the site's own.

4. Accounts: if you were signed in to an affected site that day, sign out everywhere (most sites have "sign out of all sessions" in security settings) and sign back in. Our assessment: on most sites this ends any session the stolen cookies could have reused, but only the site can confirm it. Change the password too if the site does not offer a sign-out-everywhere option.

5. From now on: before sending crypto, compare the whole address on the wallet's own screen with the address you were given, by a second channel if the amount matters. Checking only the first and last few characters can be beaten by look-alike addresses. Clipboard swapping is not new and will not end with this incident.

Addresses to check against

If an outgoing transfer went to one of these addresses, it went to the attacker. They are the eight wallets Report URI lists, as of 16 November. Other attacker wallets may exist.

BTC   19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
ETH   0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e   (and other EVM chains)
TRON  THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
SOL   FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
TON   UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
LTC   ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
BCH   qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE  DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

How you know it is over

For visitors, it ended when the code was removed from the sites, which Report URI saw happen between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC on 16 November, with one site still infected at 21:52 UTC. Optimizely's status notice of 01:02 UTC on 17 November says the injected code has been removed and protections added, and the incident was still marked "Monitoring" when we read it on 17 November. Your own exposure is over once your iPhone or iPad is updated, your issuer has dealt with any card you typed in, your sessions are reset and you have re-copied any wallet address you copied that day.

If you run a website: this is about every third-party script, not only Optimizely

The lesson for a site owner is uncomfortable. These companies were not hacked in the usual sense. They loaded a script from a supplier they trusted, as most sites do with analytics, chat, testing and advertising tags, and the supplier's script was changed. Anything you load from someone else's server runs with the same power as your own code: it can read every form, every readable cookie and every word on the page.

If you use Optimizely Web, do these now, from Report URI's and Optimizely's guidance:

  • Open the Project JavaScript of every project and the custom code of every experiment. Search for 1688360, atob( and any code you did not write. Searching the domain alone misses one variant, which hid it in base64, and another, which carried the whole payload inline.
  • Review who and what can write to the Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate the credentials. Optimizely says it reset access for affected accounts; check yours anyway.
  • If your checkout takes card numbers in your own form fields, treat cards entered on 16 November as exposed and tell your payment processor. Our assessment: card exposure usually brings obligations under your merchant agreement and, depending on where you and your customers are, breach-notification law. Take advice; do not decide this alone.
  • Treat any session token or secret held in a cookie without the HttpOnly flag as exposed, and rotate it.
  • Decide whether to tell your customers. Optimizely says it has notified all affected customers; your visitors only hear it from you.

Whatever third-party scripts you use, three changes reduce the damage the next time:

  • A Content Security Policy that limits where the page may send data (connect-src), avoids 'unsafe-eval', and reports violations. Report URI found that allowing the supplier's own domain did not help, and that settings like 'strict-dynamic' let the payload through; restricting connect-src blocked the data theft in 17 of the cases it examined.
  • Card fields in your payment provider's embedded frame, never in your own form. This alone put card numbers out of the skimmer's reach.
  • HttpOnly on every session cookie, so no script can read it.

Our assessment: Subresource Integrity, the usual answer to "what if the script changes", does not fit here, because a testing snippet changes whenever an experiment is edited, so its hash cannot be pinned.

What to look for, and what to keep

For your network or DNS logs, these are the attacker hosts Report URI lists. Block them, subdomains included, and search 13 to 17 November for any device that contacted one:

1688360[.]cc                 track.js, card.php, hit.php
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu        iOS exploit router
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu        iOS exploit router
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu        exploit-kit telemetry
webshell[.]lol               earlier wave (13-16 Nov)
linkforge[.]cc               earlier injector
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu  q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu  ios-hack[.]icu
p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu  1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu  gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu
  • A company iPhone or iPad that contacted one of the iOS hosts is a device to examine, not only to update. Hand it to whoever handles incidents before wiping it, so the evidence survives.
  • Site owners: keep a dated copy of every third-party script as you served it on 13 to 16 November, your CSP violation reports and your checkout logs for 16 November. A clean script today does not prove it was clean on the day, and these are what a processor, an insurer or a regulator will ask for.
  • Visitors: keep screenshots of any suspicious transfer or card charge, with the date and the site, for the exchange, the bank and the police report.

What we could not confirm

  • How the attacker got in, beyond Optimizely's own words: a vulnerability in Experimentation, which BleepingComputer reports Optimizely described as its account signup flow. No CVE id or technical detail had been published by 17 November.
  • How many people were affected, how many cards were taken, or whether any iPhone was actually compromised. The $7,040 is wallet receipts seen by 19:25 UTC on 16 November, not a loss total.
  • The full list of affected sites. Report URI found the scripts mostly through its own crawl, and some of the same code arrived on other sites through other suppliers.
  • Which Apple security fixes the iOS exploit chains depend on. The patched versions above come from the kit's own comments, as Report URI reads them, not from Apple.

We did not see this attack ourselves. We have no view into these sites or their visitors, and everything above comes from the sources listed, read on 17 November. Where we give advice that is ours rather than theirs, the text says so.

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