rucio, CVE-2026-100397: a new CVE scored 10
The bottom line
If you run Rucio on a version below the fixed releases, upgrade to 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2 or 41.1.1 this week, starting with any server that untrusted networks can reach. If you do not run Rucio, stop reading.
Free analysis report · 10 pagesrucio, CVE-2026-100397: a new CVE scored 10The same note as a document you can keep or forward: what the sources say, who is affected, and what to do first.Download the analysis report →At a glance
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Product | rucio (CVE-2026-100397) |
| Severity | Critical: 10 (CVSS 3.1) |
| Status | A new CVE record, published by GitHub on 17 November 2026. Not on CISA's list of exploited vulnerabilities when we read it on 17 November 2026, which means nothing public says yet that anyone is using it. |
| Fixed in | 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, 41.1.1 (as the CVE record states them) |
| Who looks first | Teams that run a Rucio server (a scientific data management framework) on 1.14.0 or later but before a fixed release, above all where the API can be reached from outside the organisation. |
Does this apply to you?
| Question | If no | If yes |
|---|---|---|
| Do you run a Rucio server, or does a partner or provider run one for you? | Nothing to do for this CVE. | Find the version (next question). |
| Is the version 1.14.0 or later, and below the fixed release for your branch? | This CVE does not apply to that version, per the record. | Treat it as affected and check exposure. |
| Can anyone outside your trusted network reach the Rucio API? | Exposure is lower, but still upgrade; any insider or compromised host could use it. | Upgrade first and restrict access until then. |
What it is
The record says a person with no account can request a short-lived SSH challenge token for any account name, then present it as an ordinary login token. The server accepts it, so they act as that account, including an administrative one.
Why it matters
The record gives a score of 10 and says no login and no user action are needed. Our reading is that this is account takeover, not data leakage alone: the attacker needs only an account name, can choose an administrative one, and could then read and change what that account controls. The weakness is CWE-287, Improper Authentication. The record does not say it is being exploited.
What the vendor's advisory says
We read one page on github.com. In short:
- The GitHub advisory page gives the CVSS 3.1 vector: network access, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, scope changed, high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.
- The page names thebatou as the finder and CWE-287 as the weakness.
- The text we have names no workaround and no other flaws fixed in the same releases.
Exposure by situation
These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.
| Your situation | Priority | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| A Rucio server on an affected version that is reachable from the internet | High | This week, before anything else |
| An affected server reachable only from an internal or partner network | Medium | This week |
| A server you cannot place on a fixed release yet | Medium | Restrict access now; patch as soon as possible |
| A Rucio server already on a fixed release | Low | Confirm the version, then no action |
| You do not run Rucio | None | None for this CVE |
Things people will get wrong
- "It is not on CISA's list, so we can wait." The record is new. The listing says nothing about whether anyone exploits it, and the record says no login is needed over the network.
- "Our users have strong passwords, so we are safe." The record says the attacker needs no credentials. They supply only an account name in a header.
- "Only the administrative account is at risk." The record says the attack works for an arbitrary account. An administrative account is named as one example.
How we would triage it
This is our judgement.
The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.
Step 1: Find the versions you run
- Ask whoever runs Rucio which servers exist and which version each one runs.
- Compare each version with the fixed releases: 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, 41.1.1.
pip show rucio
rucio --version
pip list | grep -i rucioStep 2: Reduce exposure
- Limit who can reach the Rucio API to networks you trust until the upgrade is done.
- The sources we have name no workaround, so treat this as a stopgap, not a fix.
Step 3: Upgrade
- Move each affected server to the fixed release on its own branch, as the record states.
- Do not skip to a release the record does not name as fixed.
Step 4: Check the result
- Confirm the running version after the restart, not just the installed package.
- Ask your provider for the confirmation in writing.
To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then.
Send this to your IT provider
Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.
Hello, we have seen CVE-2026-100397 in Rucio. It lets an unauthenticated person obtain a login token for any account, including an administrative one. Please tell us whether we run Rucio anywhere, on which servers, and which version each runs. The fixed versions are 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2 and 41.1.1. If any server is below its fixed version, please upgrade it and limit access to the API until then. Please confirm the versions and the fix in writing by the end of this week. Thank you.
The weakness behind it
The record classes this as CWE-287.
Likely ATT&CK mapping
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.
| The step, in plain words | Stage of an attack | Why we think so |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): Breaking in through a service that faces the internet, such as a web server, VPN or login page. | Initial Access: getting in | The record says an unauthenticated attacker reaches the API over a network, so this would likely be used to get in through an exposed Rucio service. |
| Valid Accounts (T1078): Logging in with a real account the attacker should not have, so the activity looks like normal use. | Initial Access: getting in | The attacker authenticates as a chosen existing account, so the activity would typically look like a legitimate user, including an administrative one. |
How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.
MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.
The sources, in their words
The CVE record:
Rucio is a scientific data management framework. From 1.14.0 until 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, and 41.1.1, validate_auth_token in lib/rucio/core/authentication.py does not distinguish short-lived SSH challenge nonces from authentication tokens stored in the same token table. An unauthenticated attacker can request /auth/ssh_challenge_token for an arbitrary account by supplying X-Rucio-Account, then present the returned X-Rucio-SSH-Challenge-Token as X-Rucio-Auth-Token to authenticate to other API endpoints as that account, including an administrative account. This issue is fixed in versions 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2, and 41.1.1.
Versions of rucio the record lists as affected:
- >= 1.14.0, < 35.9.1
- >= 36.0.0, < 38.6.1
- >= 39.0.0, < 40.4.2
- >= 41.0.0, < 41.1.1
The record gives no version ranges. Use the vendor's advisory for the affected versions.
Check your own project
If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.
lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2026-100397Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.
Check the servers you run
The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware (maker, model, firmware), the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.
lattice-scan --cve CVE-2026-100397A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. By default it opens the images your containers are running and reads their operating system and package list; a deep scan (--deep, a few minutes) opens every local image and the Python, Node, Java and Ruby packages inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.
Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.
- Which way into Lattice fits your job →The command line, the Claude skill or the MCP server: what each needs, what works without a key and how to read the result.
- Lattice, the MCP server →The public graph the command reads, for AI agents over MCP.
- Install and connect →The signed apt repository, the fingerprint, and the connection commands for each client.
What we do not know yet
- Whether the flaw is being exploited. The record is new and CISA does not list it.
- Whether any workaround exists. The text we have names none.
- How an attack would show in Rucio logs. The sources do not say.
- Exploitation is not recorded. That is not the same as none.
- This is a new record: scores, versions and wording can change in the first days, and they are as at 17 November 2026. We read the vendor pages listed under Sources; nothing here has been tested.
- The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.