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CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Sources read 2026-11-17. MITRE's own page · All weakness notes · Added to CISA's list in the last seven days

What it is

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

MITRE classes it as a base-level weakness and rates the likelihood of exploit as medium.

What it lets an attacker do

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

  • Modify Application Data, Unexpected State (affects: integrity)
  • DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU) (affects: availability)
  • Varies by Context (affects: other)

On CISA's exploited list

From CISA's exploited list

2 of the 109 entries CISA added from 2026-08-21 to 2026-11-18 name CWE-502, against 6 of 71 in the 90 days before. Over the whole catalogue 72 entries name it. The counts are small, so read them as a rough order, not a rate.

CISA's list is not every flaw that is exploited: it holds the ones CISA has evidence of, listed on the day it added them.

  • CVE-2026-115731, Perforce Puppet Enterprise, added 2026-11-17
  • CVE-2021-23758, Ajax.NET Professional Ajax.NET Professional, added 2026-08-26
  • CVE-2026-63077, JetBrains TeamCity, added 2026-08-05
  • CVE-2026-50522, Microsoft SharePoint, added 2026-07-22
  • CVE-2026-58644, Microsoft SharePoint, added 2026-07-16

How MITRE says to find it

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

  • Automated Static Analysis

What MITRE suggests

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

These are MITRE's suggestions, quoted as it gives them. They are not a complete fix and not a substitute for reading the vendor's advisory for the product you run.

  • Architecture and Design: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be.

Attack patterns MITRE links to it

From MITRE's CWE catalogue

Our technical analyses that name it

From our own notes

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